It therefore denied defendants Batson/Wheeler motion.īoth the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity.
#SVP PROTOCOL TRIAL#
The trial court found defendant had not made a prima facie case of discrimination and that the prosecutor had lawful, race-neutral reasons for challenging Mr. E.s race could be seen as favorable by the prosecution because some of defendants victims were African-American. had at least two prior police contacts, and that she had been forced to accept certain jurors she would otherwise have excused from the main jury because she had run out of peremptory challenges. Counsel asserted the prosecutors challenge lacked race-neutral reasons, particularly in light of what appeared to me to be similar answers from other individuals who were not challenged. was racially discriminatory in violation of Batson v. He had no strong feelings for or against law enforcement as a result of these situations and believed he could fairly judge defendants case.ĭefense counsel argued that the prosecutors challenge to Mr.
felt the police handled the situation fairly and appropriately. and the same relative had been stopped for jaywalking and the relative was arrested for evading the police. Charges were brought against his relative, but Mr. E.s relatives had been accused of a crime the previous year. reported that his house was burglarized five years earlier and the burglar was never apprehended. In response to a juror questionnaire that asked prospective jurors about their prior experiences with crime, Mr. E., the sole African-American man in the original venire from which the 12 jurors were selected. The prosecutor used her first peremptory challenge against Mr. The parties then began selection of two alternate jurors. 11, to complete the selection of 12 jurors. B., whom defendant excused, and then by juror No. B., whose seat was filled by prospective juror Ms. The prosecutor used her sixth and last peremptory challenge against prospective juror Mr. This appeal timely followed.ĭefendant contends the court erred in rejecting his Batson/Wheeler challenge to the prosecutors excusal of an alternate juror. The court committed him to the custody of the Department for treatment and confinement for an indeterminate term. The jury found defendant to be a sexually violent predator. He also asserted the protocol used by the Department of Mental Health (the Department) to evaluate potential sexually violent predators is an unlawful underground regulation, and on that ground moved to dismiss the petition. Defendant moved to strike the petition on the ground that the statute, as amended in 2006 to authorize commitment for an indeterminate term, violated principles of due process, equal protection, ex post facto and double jeopardy. The issues presented here arise from the district attorneys petition to extend defendants commitment under the SVPA filed on October 2, 2006. ) Their discussion is not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.
The crimes that led to defendants initial commitment as a sexually violent predator are discussed in our prior opinion affirming that commitment. We find no merit in any of McKnights other contentions, and accordingly affirm the judgment in all other respects. We order the case remanded for further proceedings on McKnights equal protection claim pursuant to People v. He contends the trial court committed Batson/Wheeler error that the psychiatric evaluations underlying the recommitment petition were invalid because they were based on an invalid regulation and that the Act, as amended to impose indeterminate commitments, violates his constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection and is an invalid ex-post facto law.
#SVP PROTOCOL CODE#
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIAĭefendant Timothy McKnight appeals after a jury trial resulted in his recommitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6600 et seq. This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).
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